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Constitutions have been made or changed in major ways in more than half the countries of the
world in recent decades. This article deals with contemporary approaches to constitution-making,
organising the analysis around three key phases: setting the agenda, in terms of both substance
and process; design, drafting and approval; and implementation. It argues that, while all constitution-
making processes are different, there are some distinctive features of constitution-making in the 21st
century that include popular participation, the need to build trust, internationalisation in its various
forms and the importance of process. The article canvasses examples of constitution-making practices
that have been or are likely to be influential. It identifies and briefly explores some of the key tensions
in constitution-making between, for example, international involvement and domestic ownership of a
Constitution and public participation and leadership.
Cite this article as: Saunders C. Constitution-making in the 21st century, International Review of
Law 2012:4 http://dx.doi.org/10.5339/irl.2012.4
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INTRODUCTION
Any human society has a set of rules or practices of some kind that governs the relations between its
members and the ways in which they make decisions affecting the group as a whole. Historically, in
many societies, such rules may have been customary and organic. But the idea of a Constitution that
took hold from the late 18th century, following the adoption of written constitutions in the United
States and France, had significant additional features. The primary constitutional rules took written
form, typically in a single document called a ‘Constitution’. These rules became supreme or
fundamental law, overriding all other law and government action. The Constitution both empowered
and limited institutions of government. Over the course of the latter part of 20th century, this became
the conception of a Constitution that now prevails throughout the world, with only a very few, sui
generis, exceptions.1
This understanding of a Constitution presents the issue of legitimacy in a new guise. It raises the
important question of the conditions under which a community and its leaders from time to time will
accept that certain rules have ‘constitutional’ status, so that they override all others and limit what
can be done in the exercise of public power, not only now or next year, but over what might be a long
period of time. The answer may depend on a range of factors: the authority for the Constitution; the
process by which it was made; its substantive content; its effectiveness; whether or not legal
continuity with the previous constitution has been maintained. The relevance of each of these factors,
the weight given, respectively, to them and the way in which they apply may vary between countries,
constitutional traditions and over time. Once, for example, it was accepted that Imperial authorities
could legitimately put Constitutions in place for their colonies, at least as a matter of law, because
they represented the ‘sovereign’ power.2 Those times have long since gone.
A very large number of Constitutions have been made across all regions of the world since the fall
of the Berlin Wall just over 20 years ago. At least 100 new Constitutions were put in place over this
period, generating a wealth of comparative constitutional experience.3 Much of this was the
consequence of regime change (central and eastern Europe; South Africa; Indonesia) although some
were also associated with the creation of new states (Timor Leste, Montenegro) or were the product
of particular local factors (Bhutan, Hungary, Myanmar). And this creative constitutional phase is not
over yet. Constitution-making processes are presently underway in, for example, Nepal, Southern
Sudan, Iceland and Fiji. A new wave of constitution-making has recently been kick-started by
successive popular uprisings in Arab states: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Libya.
As contemporary constitution-making evolved in the latter part of the 20th century it assumed
some distinctive features, which became even more pronounced in the early 21st century.
First, there is now, effectively, universal acceptance that the authority for a Constitution must derive,
in one way or another, from the people of the state concerned.4 This idea is not, of course, new, but it
has been reinforced by the aspirations of people everywhere in the aftermath of the overthrow of
authoritarian regimes. Moreover it now has a practical as well as theoretical dimension. People now
expect actually to be involved in the constitution-making process and not just symbolically
associated with it; a point to which I will return.
Secondly, most Constitutions are now made for multi-cultural societies, some of which are, or have
been, in conflict.5 This is a change from earlier times when it was assumed, rightly or wrongly, that a
Constitution was made for a people with a common history, religion and language to whom, however
fancifully, a common will might be attributed. These new conditions place much greater expectations
on Constitutions: to build the nation as well as the state; to provide at least some of the missing
1The United Kingdom is the most obvious and clear-cut example of these. See for example the foreword to the Cabinet
Manual (1st edition: October 2011) by Prime Minister Cameron: ‘‘This country has a rich constitution developed through
history and practice, and the Cabinet Manual is invaluable in recording this...’’, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/
default/files/resources/cabinet-manual.pdf.
2Australia is an unusual case in point, where the current Constitution was enacted by the then Imperial power but
now typically is attributed to the sovereignty of the Australian people, in fully independent Australia: Cheryl Saunders, The
Constitution of Australia: A Contextual Analysis, (Hart Publishing, 2011), 59-64.
3For a useful, recent, calculation of the breakdown of new Constitutions made over recent decades see International
IDEA, Constitution Building After Conflict, Policy Paper, May 2011, 9.
4From a huge literature see, for example, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, ‘Promoting a Culture of
Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth Africa’, Recommendations to Commonwealth Heads of Government,
1999.
5Again, from a large literature, see Sujit Choudhry (ed), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies (Oxford: OUP, 2010).
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cohesion; to protect minorities against decisions of the majority that are not compatible with peaceful
and mutually fulfilling co-existence.6 To fulfill these expectations, the Constitution-making process
must not only be inclusive, but must also engender trust, between segments of the community,
between their leaders and between leaders and the people. The deeper the divisions in society the
more important trust is likely to be and the more challenging it will be to achieve.
A third, marked characteristic of constitution-making in the 21st century is the involvement of the
international community, or segments of it, in what traditionally has been regarded as primarily, if not
exclusively, the business of a state and its people.7 International involvement is most intense where a
constitution-making process is preceded by some form of conflict, attracting the peace-making offices
of the UN or other states, which in turn have the potential to spill over into constitutional process or
design.8 Even leaving these extraordinary—although not uncommon-cases aside, however,
international law now impinges on constitution-making in a variety of other ways. International
human rights norms increasingly are incorporated into Constitutions, either by reference or in
transcribed form.9 And an argument is gathering strength that public participation in
constitution-making is not only a sensible national strategy but also a right under international law.10
The obvious tension here between international standards and local constitutional ownership is
eased somewhat by the reality that local populations typically expect their own Constitutions to
comply with international norms of this kind.
Segments of the international community also are involved in constitution-making in a range of
other ways through, for example, the provision of constitutional advisers by NGOs and under foreign
aid programs. There is a tension here as well, between the international involvement and local
ownership, which is less readily resolved. Foreign advisers bring valuable expertise, by way of
knowledge about options for constitutional process and how similar problems for substantive
constitutional design have been handled elsewhere. They do not necessarily understand the context
of the host country, however or appreciate the significance of particular features of the local context
for the process by which the Constitution is made and for decisions about constitutional design. Their
loyalties may also be divided, between the needs of the host jurisdiction and the expectations of a
donor state. The solution lies in the use of experts with comparative insights and in crafting a role for
experts that makes their knowledge and skills available in a form that is as helpful as possible
without pre-empting either local direction or choice. There is a growing awareness of the need for this
balance to be struck and some progress has been made towards doing so, although there is still a
long way to go.11
One final characteristic of constitution-making in the 21st century is the emphasis on process as
opposed to the content of the Constitution or, in other words, on the way in which the Constitution is
developed as opposed to what it contains at a particular point in time.12 Process has always been
important, in the sense that both the role and status of a Constitution mean that it should be made in
a way that differs, preferably significantly, from the ordinary law-making process. The significance of
process is now further enhanced, however, by the contemporary focus on public participation in
constitution-making and the need to build trust. Getting these right increasingly is seen as a key to a
Constitution that is effective and lasting. Process can underpin the legitimacy of a Constitution,
increase public knowledge of it, instill a sense of public ownership and create an expectation that the
Constitution will be observed, in spirit as well as form. A constitution-making process may assist to
set the tone for ordinary politics, including the peaceful transfer of power in accordance with
constitutional rules.
6Armin von Bogdandy et al, ‘State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations:
Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches’ in A. Von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum (eds), 9 Max
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 279 (2005).
7One recent article, however, offers a timely reminder that constitution-making has always had ‘a built-in international
dimension’; not least because of the need for acceptance of an emerging state by the international community: Chaihark
Hahm and Sung Ho Kim, ‘To make ‘‘We the People’’: Constitutional Founding in Postwar Japan and South Korea’, 8
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 800, 810 (2010).
8Simon Chesterman, You the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State Building (Oxford: OUP,
2004).
9TomGinsburg, Svitlana Chernykh, Zachary Elkins, ‘Commitment andDiffusion: How andWhy Constitutions Incorporate
International Law’, 1 Illinois Law Review 201, 208–209 (2008).
10Vivian Hart, ‘Democratic Constitution Making’, USIP Special Report 107, July 2003.
11For one contribution, see International IDEA, Constitution Building After Conflict, op.cit.
12Hart, op.cit.
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The remaining sections of this article are built around the stages of a 21st century
constitution-making process. I distinguish three in particular: the period during which a range of
critical preliminary decisions about a constitution-making exercise are made, described below in
terms of setting an ‘agenda’; the various processes for design, drafting, agreement and approval; and
the final but important phase of constitutional implementation. No process is the same and each
varies with the local conditions at the time constitution-making is undertaken: the circumstances that
led to the demand or need for a new Constitution; the configuration and distribution of power; the
implications of geography, demography and socio-economic factors for the logistics of a
constitution-making exercise. Nevertheless, all constitution-making processes go through these
general stages, whether they are acknowledged or not. In relation to each of the three principal
stages, I will continue to trace some of the themes that have been identified already, including
legitimacy, trust, public participation and the complex mix of local and international forces.
AGENDA SETTING
Concept
In any constitution-making exercise there is a stage before it gets much publicity, when the agenda
effectively is set. The idea of an ‘agenda’ for this purpose includes the process itself, the decision
about whether to make a new Constitution or to amend the existing one and, in either event, the
parameters of the new constitutional dispensation.
In terms of the process, decisions likely to be made at this stage include the nature of the
constitution-making body, whether new elections are required and, if so, when, the electoral rules
that should apply in this case, how the state is to be governed during the constitution-making period,
procedures for approval and ratification of the final draft Constitution and strategies for public
participation. Not all of these considerations are relevant for every process; where the existing
Constitution is to be amended, for example, the incumbent government and legislature may well
continue in office at least until the changes are made, so that there is no need to provide transitional
governing arrangements during this period. Ideally, the entire process constitution-making process
should be prescribed in advance, together with appropriate and realistic timelines. Because it is
impossible to predict all the contingencies that may arise, however, this road map should have a
degree of inbuilt flexibility that enables adjustments to be made to overcome expected flexibility.13
There is advantage in making advance provision for the resolution of deadlocks as well.14
This is the stage also at which a decision must be made whether to maintain legal continuity with
the previous constitution. A decision in favour of continuity effectively determines how the new
constitutional arrangements will be brought into effect as law. A decision against continuity leaves
this question open. Many, although by no means all constitution-making processes seek continuity.
In some cases, however, a decision is made to return to an earlier Constitution as in Indonesia in
195915; a similar course was considered in Thailand after the election of the Yingluck government in
2011, although this was subsequently overtaken by a proposal to amend the existing constitution.16
In other constitution-making exercises the new Constitution is intended to stand alone, as a fresh
expression of popular will that is revolutionary, at least in legal terms.17
Continuity is relevant to legitimacy but not essential, as long as legitimacy can be secured in other
ways. A decision to make a new Constitution in a way not prescribed by the previous Constitution thus
makes the design of an alternative constitution-making process all the more important. I note in
passing that a decision against legal continuity does not affect the question of whether the previous
13Too much flexibility is undesirable, however, and may undermine respect for constitutional processes. The repeated
extensions of the term of the Constituent Assembly in Nepal, justified for a time by reliance on the doctrine of necessity,
is a case in point: see analysis by Bipin Adhikari, ‘The doctrine of necessity is vulnerable on any ground’, http://
constituent-assembly.blogspot.com.au/.
14For a comprehensive overview of many of these issues see Michele Brandt, Jill Cottrell, Yash Ghai and Anthony Regan,
Constitution Making and Reform: Options for the Process, (Interpeace, 2011).
15Denny Indrayana, Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999–2002 (Kompas, 2002), 6–10; see also Adnan Buyung
Nasution, The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia, (Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1992).
16‘Poll: Majority for Return of 1997 Charter’, Bangkok Post, 11 December 2011, ‘Pheu Thai stands by CDA Plan’, Bankok
Post, 11 January 2012.
17Colombia became a case in point in the course of the constitution-making process: Donald T. Fox, Gustavo Gallon-
Giraldo and Anne Stetson, ‘Lessons of the Colombian Constitutional Reform of 1991’ in Laurel E. Miller (ed), Framing the
State in Times of Transition, (USIP Press, 2010), 467.
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Constitution is used as a de facto model, in whole or in part. Most new Constitutions build on familiar
principles and institutions, even where they are ostensibly making a fresh start.
Finally, the agenda setting phase also determines the ambit of change even when, as sometimes is
the case, ultimately no limits are prescribed. If for example, it is decided to introduce new
constitutional arrangements through amendments to the existing Constitution, there is likely to be an
early indication of the areas in which change is sought or, conversely, of the parts of the Constitution
that must be preserved. Even in the case of a process to establish a completely new Constitution the
essentials of the new arrangements may be prescribed in advance: democracy, republicanism,
parliamentary or presidential, the form of electoral system; and so on. There is a link between limits
of this kind and the design of the constitution-making body itself. The more legitimate the
constitution-making body in its own right, the greater its potential to depart from its terms of
reference as long as, ultimately, it is confident of securing final approval for the Constitution.18 The
decision of the Philadelphia Convention in 1789 to ignore its mandate by drawing up a new
Constitution for the United States is merely the most famous example of this kind.19
Method
As the first agenda setting phase of the constitution-making process has a relatively low profile, there
is danger that important decisions will be made by default, without adequate reflection or
consultation. Most obviously, where a country is emerging from conflict, all or parts of the
constitutional agenda may effectively be set in the course of the peace process, in a way that has the
advantage of bringing the conflict to an end, but that also has unsatisfactory consequences for the
Constitution in the longer term. The Constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was literally
prescribed by the Dayton Peace Accords, is the most high-profile case in point.20 The guarantees to
the Bosniac, Serb and Croat communities that finally brought the conflict to an end entrenched a
constitutional model with weak and fractured central institutions, built on ethnic lines, which so far
has proved impervious to change.21 Even in less dramatic circumstances, however, decisions about
all or parts of the constitution-making agenda may be made inadvertently or without adequate
planning or consultation. And yet this is a critical period, at which choices can effectively determine
the success or failure of a constitution-making process. This is also the point at which it is important
to lay the foundations of trust between key stakeholders.
The significance of this phase can be illustrated by the example of South Africa, as it moved to
create a new, non-racial Constitution following the collapse of apartheid.22 There was deep mistrust
between the principal political groupings, as a legacy of the long history of apartheid. Violent acts
had been committed on all sides. There was potential for even more violence unless a mutually
satisfactory solution was reached. And the interests and goals of the principal players were
diametrically opposed. This is evident even if attention is confined to the position of the two major
parties. The incumbent National Party government controlled the existing Parliament, which had been
elected on a racial franchise. It also controlled the other institutions of the state, including the police,
the military and the broadcasting service. It was clear that it would lose power to the disenfranchised
majority once non-racial elections were held. And it was apprehensive of the Constitution that would
be put in place, once control over the organs of state power changed.
The African National Congress, on the other hand, was confident of easily winning the elections
once a non-racial franchise was introduced. For that, however, constitutional change was needed, if
legal continuity was to be preserved. And it was not prepared to accept that the new Constitution
could be put in place by a Parliament elected on the apartheid franchise that in its eyes, not
18The example of Colombia, cited earlier, illustrates this phenomenon. So too does Benin: see Pearl T. Robinson, ‘The
National Conference Phenomenon in Francophone Africa’, 36 Comparative Studies in Society and History, (1994), 575.
19Gordon S. Wood, the Creation of the American Republic, (WW Norton and Co, 1969), ch. XII.
20General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
attached as Annex 4.
21For an analysis of the Constitution shortly after it came into effect, see Sienho Yee, ‘The New Constitution of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’, 7 European Journal of International Law (1996), 176. The dynamics of proposals for constitutional
change are examined in Florian Bieber, ‘Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preparing for EU Accession’,
Policy Brief, (European Policy Centre, 2010).
22For a detailed analysis of the important South African example see Heinz Klug, ‘Constitution-making, democracy and
the ‘civilizing’ of Irreconcilable conflict: What might we learn from the South African Miracle?’ 25 Wisconsin International
Law Journal 269 (2007).
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surprisingly, lacked legitimacy for the purpose. Nor was it prepared to allow the National Party to
control other key institutions of the state while the elections and the constitution-making process
were underway. While it could have seized power by force and made a Constitution unilaterally this
would have precipitated a bloodbath, which was in no-one’s interest.
The eventual solution provides a textbook example of bringing stakeholders together during the
agenda setting phase to agree on both a process and constitutional outcomes with which all parties
could live. At the risk of oversimplifying a highly complex and fraught process the key steps were
these. A multi-party negotiating forum (MPNF) agreed on 34 principles with which the final
Constitution was required to comply. These included, for example, a democratic system of
government based on equality and non-discrimination; separation of powers; judicial independence;
proportional representation; freedom of information; and the protection of linguistic and cultural
diversity. The 34 principles were enshrined in an interim Constitution, which was written by the MPNF
but formally enacted by the white majority Parliament.23 The Interim Constitution thus created
continuity with the previous Constitution, which stemmed from the apartheid era, without
jeopardising the legitimacy of the final Constitution that was still to come. The Interim Constitution
also provided for the election of a new Parliament on the basis of a non-racial electoral system; set
out a process by which this Parliament, doubling as a Constitutional Assembly would draw up and
approve the final Constitution; and provided arrangements for power-sharing in government during
this period. In addition, to give security to all parties that the constitutional principles would be
observed, the Interim Constitution required the final Constitution to be certified as compliant with the
principles by a new, independent Constitutional Court.24
This process, broadly, worked and the South African example still is much admired. The finite
details are peculiar to the South African context and are unlikely to be possible to replicate
elsewhere. At a more general level, however, the South African case is highly instructive. The South
Africans were able to establish a sufficient level of trust between stakeholders to facilitate agreement
on the parameters for a new, democratic Constitution and on the relatively open and participatory
process by which it would be made. In doing so, they drew attention to the usefulness of the device of
an interim Constitution to solve the problem of transition from a government with contested
legitimacy to a new governing regime that draws its authority from a new Constitution, the legitimacy
of which is beyond doubt.
Public participation is most difficult during this first phase of a constitution building process.
Typically, this stage is less formal and transparent. Negotiations between stakeholders may need to
be confidential to be effective. On the other hand, public participation may be necessary to gain
public acceptance of the legitimacy of the process and to inform decisions about critical features of
the new Constitution. This was somewhat less important in South Africa, where the MPNF was broadly
inclusive and the two major parties were confident that they were speaking for their members.
Nevertheless, this is one aspect of the South African process that was open to criticism. Under less
favourable conditions, of which Fiji is an example, as it emerges from military rule, public participation
in an appropriate form is likely to be even more important during the agenda setting phase.
DESIGN AND APPROVAL
The second phase of a 21st century constitution-making process is more familiar. This is the stage
during which a draft of the Constitution is developed and becomes law. Exactly what this involves
depends on the mechanisms used; an issue that is taken up below. As a generalization, however, it
requires policy decisions about the content of the Constitution, a drafting process to give these
decisions legal form, agreement on the draft as a whole and a procedure for bringing the Constitution
into effect as fundamental law. Various different mechanisms are available for this purpose, alone or
in combination with each other.25 Three of the most common are as follows. The first is an advisory
body of some kind, constituted by experts or representatives or both.26 The second is an elected
23Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution). The key provisions dealing with
the Constitutional Principles were s.71 and schedule 4.
24This duly occurred: see Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa 1996(4)SA 744 (CC).
25A table setting out the institutions used in 19 relatively recent cases of constitution-making can be found in Laurel E.
Miller, op.cit, 607–610. See also Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai and Regan, op.cit, Part 3. As both sources show, a combination of
these basic mechanisms increasingly is the norm.
26The three-person Constitutional Commission of Fiji, appointed in 1995, offers one example.
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body, which may be either a regular legislature or a specially constituted Constitutional Assembly.27
The third is a referendum.28
Each of these mechanisms has strengths and weaknesses. Typically, an advisory body has
expertise; in some cases, it may also be broadly representative. But it is unlikely to have the
legitimacy to bring the Constitution into effect as law. It is always, therefore, combined with another
process that is accepted as having authority to make a Constitution law, usually because participants
are elected in some way. In this case, however, it is necessary to pay attention to the relationship
between the advisory and elected body, to minimise divisions and misunderstandings that might
jeopardise the success of the constitution-making project.29 An elected body may have legitimacy in
its own right to approve and enact the Constitution. But paradoxically, it may not always be
sufficiently representative for constitution-making, if its composition relies solely on the ordinary
electoral process, drawing on established parties. If the elected body is a regular legislature,
moreover, it may prove difficult to rise above ordinary politics; while if it is a Constituent Assembly,
there may be a question about its relationship to the legislature.30 Finally, a referendum is not a
stand-alone mechanism, but relies on some other process to design and draft the Constitution and to
approve the version that is submitted to referendum. In theory, ratification by referendum confers a
high degree of legitimacy. But a referendum is also a blunt instrument, seeking only approval or
rejection. The quality of the Constitution depends on the earlier process, whatever it is. There is a high
risk that a referendum outcome will be manipulated by political forces or that votes will be cast by
reference to issues that have nothing much to do with the draft Constitution but are instead, for
example, a response to populist politics. In any event, a referendum must be coupled with a very
effective public information campaign if the outcome is to have a chance of reflecting actual public
opinion about the new Constitution.
The arrangements for design and approval of a new Constitution should be chosen with its
legitimacy and effectiveness in mind. In practice, the final choice is likely also to be influenced by a
combination of constitutional tradition and conditions on the ground. Is there an existing legislature
that is suitable for the purposes of making and approving a new Constitution? Does the state have a
tradition of resorting to the constituent power as authority for a new constitution from time to time or
is constitutional continuity the norm? Are there groups who should be included in constitutional
deliberations but who would be unlikely to succeed in an ordinary electoral contest? These and similar
considerations help to explain the very different deliberative processes adopted around the world in
relatively recent times in, for example, Timor Leste, Kenya, Benin, Indonesia, Colombia and Nepal.
Important though these choices are, it is also necessary in each case to pay attention to a host of
lesser but important details that may tip the balance between failure and success. Most
constitution-making bodies assign initial responsibility for parts of the new Constitution to a series of
committees. Thus, for example, the Constitutional Assembly of South Africa established six ‘theme’
committees, dealing respectively with the character of the democratic state,31 the structure of
government, the relationship between levels of government, fundamental rights, the judiciary and
legal systems, and specialised structures of government.32 While this is a suitable categorisation for
South Africa, it may not necessarily suit states with different problems and priorities, which must
design their own procedures to meet their own needs. Whatever categorisation is chosen, it is
27Spain offers a relatively clear example of reliance on a legislature; Timor Leste is an example of election of a
Constituent Assembly. The distinction often becomes blurred, however. For example (as in Timor Leste) a Constituent
Assembly sometimes transforms becomes the first legislature once the Constitution is made; in other states, of which
South Africa is an example, the legislature constitutes itself as a specialised constitution-making body at specific times.
28European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) Code of Good Practice on Referendums,
adopted by the Commission at its 70th meeting, March 2007, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)
008-e.pdf.
29Arguably, this was a problem in Fiji: see the course of events described in Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, ‘Between coups:
Constitution Making in Fiji’, in Laurel E. Miller (ed), op.cit, 275. It was also an issue in the much more complex Kenyan
arrangements that led up to the failure of the referendum in 2005: the events are described in Alicia L. Bannon, ‘Designing
a Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya’, 116 Yale Law Journal, 1826 (2007).
30This was an issue in Colombia, where the regular legislature ultimately was dissolved: Fox, Gallon-Giraldo and Stetson,
op cit., 474.
31This committee dealt with fundamental questions going to the character of the state including equality, democracy
and constitutional supremacy: Constitutional Assembly, Annual Report, May 1994–May 1995.
32This committee subsequently was sub-divided into four, dealing with public administration, financial institutions and
public enterprises, transformation and monitoring and the security apparatus: Annual Report 1994–1995, op.cit.
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necessary to provide a process to effectively co-ordinate the decisions of the committees, in the
interests of the coherence of the final constitutional draft. Amongst a host of other questions, the
following are crucial considerations. What should be the timeframe for finalising the draft
Constitution? How should deadlocks be resolved? Should super-majorities be required to approve the
Constitution in an Assembly or by referendum, in recognition of the higher status of a Constitution?
What should be the minimum prescribed turnout for a referendum, if one is held?
This is the phase also in which extensive public participation is widely expected and practised.
Designing effective public participation in constitution-making is, however, rapidly becoming an art in
itself. The days have long since passed when public participation took the form of public meetings
addressed by political leaders or constitutional experts, seeking public approval for developed
constitutional proposals. The public is now expected to be engaged actively during the formative
stages of constitutional deliberation.33 This requires a foundation of public information and
education in a form that is helpful and reliable. It needs to be tailored to the needs of different
segments of the public and made available through a wide range of media. Laying this foundation is
not easy, because constitutional ideas are often so abstract.
Successive constitution-making exercises have learnt from each other, in this regard. The
engagement of the public in South Africa, for example, was another much admired feature of this
process, credited with attracting 2 million public submissions, although the actual number of
independent submissions seems to have been considerably less. Many of the techniques used in
South Africa to attract public interest and garner public participation are worthy of adoption
elsewhere.34 On the other hand, questions later were raised in South Africa about how effectively all
the submissions had been taken into account. More recent processes have paid greater attention to
this aspect of public participation.35 Systems need to be designed to ensure submissions are
collated, disseminated and analysed so as to ensure that contributions from the public make a
difference to the Constitution that is not only symbolic but real.
There is continuing innovation in the design of deliberative constitution-making processes with
extensive public participation. The high water mark so far is the very recent constitution-making
process in Iceland, which followed the disastrous financial collapse in the country suffered in 2008.36
The crisis gave rise to widespread dissatisfaction with the political system, as well as with Icelandic
financial institutions, and to a movement for constitutional change. The body in Iceland with the legal
authority to replace the Constitution is the Icelandic Parliament, or Althing.37 As a prelude to action
by the Parliament, however, an eye-catching and elaborate constitution-making process has been
followed.38 This began with a discussion about constitutional values, in a ‘National Forum’ involving
more than 1000 delegates, randomly selected from the public. Following this brief, one day meeting
a Constitutional Council was appointed, after an abortive electoral process,39 to draw up a
Constitution, which is likely to be submitted to referendum before enactment by the Althing. The
Council used the technique of ‘crowdsourcing’ to engage with the public about the constitutional
draft, using all forms of social media including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Flickr.40 The fate of the
draft Constitution at referendum and in the legislature will be determined over the course of 2012.
Whatever the outcome, however, it is likely this will not be the last of crowdsourcing as a technique of
constitution-making in the 21st century.
33For an early articulation of this position see Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Promoting a Culture of
Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth Africa, Report to the Commonwealth Heads of Government, 1999.
34A good account of the techniques is found in Hassen Ebrahim, The Soul of a Nation- Constitution-Making in South
Africa (OUP, 2000). Hassen Ebrahim was the Executive Director of the Constitutional Assembly.
35For a comprehensive account, see Brandt, Cottrell, Ghai and Regan, op.cit, part 2.2.
36For an account of key events as the crisis unfolded, see ‘Time-line: Key events since Icelandic crisis’, Financial Times, 5
January 2010. For reaction and analysis see, for example, Andre Snaer Magnason, Dreamland—Self-Help for a Frightened
Nation, (Citizen Press, 2008).
37Constitution of the Republic of Iceland, Article 79.
38For one, accessible, description see Richard Bater, ‘Hope from below- composing the com-
mons in Iceland’, Open Democracy, 1 December 2011, http://www.opendemocracy.net/richard-bater/
hope-from-below-composing-commons-in-iceland.
39This part of the process was messy. The election itself was invalidated by the Supreme Court; the victors were
nevertheless appointed to the Constitutional Council by the government: Bater, op.cit.
40Ibid. See also the website of the Constitutional Council itself: http://stjornlagarad.is/english/.
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IMPLEMENTATION
The final phase of a constitution-making process is implementation. This phase extends for an
indefinite period from the time the Constitution is passed. For obvious reasons, it is most intense in
the first few years. The immediate target of implementation is the wide range of action that needs to
be taken to give any Constitution effect. All manner of laws must be passed including, for example,
electoral laws and laws to give detailed effect to aspects of a bill of rights. Constitutional institutions
such as Human Rights Commissions must be established, generally also by law. Judicial and other
appointments must be made. The first legislature must be elected and its committees constituted.
And so the list goes on. Less obvious, no less important but undoubtedly even more difficult is the
need to establish a constitutional culture in which constitutional mandates are understood, and both
the letter and the spirit of the Constitution are observed, by those who have the responsibility for
exercising public power: members of the executive branch, legislatures, courts and both the civil and
security services.
Until relatively recently this stage of constitution-making attracted little attention. Once a
Constitution became law national euphoria died quickly, the international community lost interest
and implementation was left to the ordinary political process. This has now changed, as experience
with the operation of new Constitutions in practice has drawn attention to the significance of the
implementation phase. Implementation is now regularly taken into account in designing a
constitution-making process, to try to encourage vigilance after the Constitution takes effect. In one
recent spectacular example, in Kenya, the demands of implementation are anticipated in the
Constitution itself. Schedules to the Constitution identify the legislation that needs to be passed,
prescribe both timelines for doing so and sanctions for failure and stipulate the creation of a
Constitution Implementation Commission (CIC), together with a parliamentary oversight body.41
Interestingly, the CIC is also charged with the responsibility of involving the public in the
implementation process.
The new focus on implementation is timely and necessary. It remains to be seen, however, how
effective formal implementation arrangements of this kind prove to be. The Kenyan approach has
undoubtedly been useful; many laws required by the new Constitution have been enacted and other
constitutional projects have been given effect based on these mandates, including initiatives
designed to enhance the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary.42 On the other hand, there
is criticism of the adequacy of implementation, on a range of fronts, including the quality of the laws
that have been enacted, patchy implementation of constitutional initiatives including, for example,
security sector reform and the lack of progress in gender equality.43 In the end, a Constitution must
attract natural support, from those engaged in public life, from civil society and from the public at
large. And so we return to the themes with which I began, the importance of legitimacy and trust.
CONCLUSION
I make three broad observations by way of conclusion.
First, constitution-making has changed significantly over recent decades and is continuing to do so.
Thanks to the sheer volume of constitution-making, the world has learnt a great deal and there is now
a considerable body of practical experience. As a generalisation, the trend is towards openness,
inclusivity and the active involvement of the people of a state at all stages of the process through
participation, rather than mere consultation. This is a complex trend, however. Leadership and vision
are necessary too. Constitution building needs to produce a workable result. In the end, the goal is to
design a process that is worthy of a task as significant as that of making a Constitution by which
people will be governed, which will be recognised as legitimate and respected and observed by those
to whom it applies.
Secondly, an ambiguous relationship has emerged between national action and international
norms in the sphere of constitution-making. Constitutions are inherently local instruments. They must
respond to local needs and they must be ‘owned’ both by the people of the state concerned and by
41For an overview, see Angela Waki and Wathingira Gituro, ‘The New Constitution of Kenya; The process of implementa-
tion’, http://www.coulsonharney.com/LawArticles/Documents/The%20New%20Constitution%20-%20Implementation.
pdf. For the formal framework, see the Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution, http://www.cickenya.org/.
42Andrews Atta-Asamoah andNyambura Githaiga, ‘Implementing Kenya’s Constitution like shooting at amoving target’,
Institute for Security Studies, 30 September 2011, http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1363.
43Ibid.
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their political leaders from time to time. It is hard to see how they can effectively perform their
functions on any other basis. At the same time, however, there are international benchmarks for
democracy and human rights which now have implications not only for the substance of constitutions
but also for the processes by which they are made. Tension between localism and universalism is
evident across the whole field of comparative constitutional law, attracting a great deal of attention
from both practitioners and scholars. There is a wide diversity of views about where the current
balance lies and there is no doubt that, in any event, it will continue to shift in response to these
opposing pressures. For the purposes of constitution-making, however, the two can broadly be
reconciled as national communities often armed with considerable knowledge about what is
happening elsewhere, draw on international standards to measure the legitimacy of their own
Constitutions and the ways in which they are made.
One final, obvious, lesson from the experiences to date of the 21st century is that making a
Constitution is not easy and the outcome is never exactly what everyone–or, perhaps, anyone–wants.
One of the reasons for the emphasis on process is to enable a satisfactory compromise to be reached
between the competing interests and ideas that are features of modern communities. As a fallback,
there are well-known instances, of which India, Ireland and Chile are examples, in which some
problems have proved so intractable that they have deliberately been left unresolved in the interests
of agreement on an otherwise satisfactory Constitution, with a view to finding a solution over time
through constitutional evolution or formal change.44 It does not seem desirable to embark on
constitution-making with less than the best possible Constitution as a deliberate goal. Constitutional
moments are too rare and too important to be wasted. But it may be useful to remember that
techniques of this kind also have worked, in various parts of the world, when difficulties arise that, for
the moment, prove intractable.
44The experience of these three states is analysed from this perspective in Hanna Lerner,Making Constitutions in Deeply
Divided Societies, (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
